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Abstract 
One of the most influential theories in the study of nationalism has been the ethnic-
East/civic-West framework developed by Hans Kohn. Using the 2002 Eurobarometer 
survey on national identity and building on earlier survey studies, this article examines 
whether the Kohn framework is valid at the level of popular understandings of nationhood. 
It scrutinizes the framework both conceptually – do people define nationhood in civic or 
ethnic terms? – and regionally – is the East indeed more ethnic than the West and the West 
more civic than the East? It will show that identity markers cluster in a political, a cultural 
and an ethnic dimension. Respondents do not see these dimensions as competing sources 
of nationhood, however. The article further lends some support for the regional component 
of the framework. Lastly, it argues that it is the intensity of national identifications rather 
than their qualitative nature (ethnic-civic) that correlates with xenophobia. 
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The sudden occurrence of (sub-state) nationalist sentiments and violent ethnic 
conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe after the collapse of communism caught 
many scholars by surprise. In accounting for these phenomena, they rediscovered 
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the ethnic-civic framework developed by Hans Kohn in World War II. Essentially 
this theory argues that civic nationalism became the dominant ideology in a few 
core states in Western Europe and America while ethnic notions of nationhood 
prevailed in Eastern Europe and the peripheral areas of Western Europe. Although 
few authors embraced this idea wholeheartedly, many of them started using the 
ethnic-civic terminology and allowed it to influence their writings. From the mid 
1990s however a growing body of literature seriously questioned the validity of the 
ethnic-East/civic-West framework both conceptually and empirically.  
Recently a number of studies have appeared that explored the extent to which 
the ethnic-civic divide is reflected in popular notions of nationhood. That is, does 
the population at large define its feeling of national belonging in ethnic-civic terms 
or is the ethnic-civic distinction a purely academic construct, driving academic 
debates but not having any impact on the national affiliations of the common man? 
Analyzing survey data of the 1995 edition of the International Social Survey 
Programme (ISSP), these studies, in brief, showed that people‟s conceptions of 
nationhood indeed clustered in an ascriptive (ethnic) and a voluntarist (civic) 
dimension. However, they did not find pronounced differences between East and 
West in the relative importance of ethnic and civic criteria. 
This study will critically engage and complement these earlier studies by 
examining the survey data of the Eurobarometer 2002 edition on national identity. 
It will address a number of questions that these studies omitted or only partially 
investigated. First, it will explore whether there are underlying dimensions in 
people‟s minds, and if so, to what extent these dimensions coincide with the ethnic-
civic dichotomy and relate to those found in the previous studies.  
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A second question this article addresses is whether civic and ethnic conceptions 
of nationhood are mutually exclusive or, on the other hand, reinforcing one another. 
That is, do people (instinctively) make tradeoffs in a sense that a preference for – 
say – a civic notion of nationhood is automatically at the expense of an ethnic one, 
or are these notions of nationhood non-competitive? In much of the literature there 
is an implicit understanding that ethnic and civic national identities exclude each 
other. It is assumed that the two cannot go together because the former is seen as a 
reflection of liberal inclusive attitudes and the latter as a manifestation of 
conservatism and xenophobia. But is there tension between the two identities at the 
level of popular understandings of nationhood? 
Third, we will examine whether there is a regional difference in the degree of 
endorsement of the various identity markers. Stated more directly: is the East 
indeed more ethnic than the West and the West more civic than the East? As the 
Eurobarometer survey included questions that covered all aspects of the ethnic-
civic distinction, we can explore its regional component to the fullest extent.  
Fourth and last, this study will investigate the relationship between identity 
markers and xenophobia. Is it true that people who predominantly support ethnic 
criteria of nationhood display more negative attitudes towards immigrants than 
people who endorse civic criteria, as many experts believe, or is the qualitative 
nature of national identities irrelevant for opinions on ethnic others?  
Analyses of the Eurobarometer data will reveal that the identity markers 
addressed by the ethnic civic framework cluster in three distinct dimensions: 
political, cultural and ethnic. The markers clustering in these dimensions are found 
to be correlating positively with one another, which indicates complementary rather 
than mutually excluding notions of nationhood. Consequently, we will argue that a 
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three-dimensional model is better suited to represent popular notions of nationhood 
than a crude ethnic-civic dichotomy or a continuum with ideal types as poles. In 
addition, and in contrast to previous studies, this study will show some support for 
the regional breakdown of the ethnic-civic framework. However, doubt is cast on 
the stability of this identity pattern. Finally, we will contend that it is the intensity 
of national affiliations rather than their qualitative nature (ethnic-civic) that appears 
to be related to xenofobia and feelings of closeness to ethnic others. 
First, a brief outline will be given of the ethnic-civic framework and of the 
criticism it evoked. The second section discusses the results of the studies on 
national identity that used the ISSP survey. Analyses of the Eurobarometer data are 
presented in section four. The article concludes by discussing the patterns found 
and sketching some implications for existing theories on national identity. 
 
The ethnic-civic dichotomy and its fate in the 1990s and after 
 
Kohn (1944; 1962; 1996) believed that the idea of the nation first arose in countries 
with a strong bourgeoisie and/or traditions of liberalism and decentralized rule 
(Great Britain, France, United States, Switzerland and The Netherlands). This new 
idea – labelled civic nationalism by Kohn – inspired millions by propagating the 
nation as a political community of citizens with equal rights and duties. Man was to 
be liberated from the social bonds – church, class, serfdom, family – that had kept 
him ignorant for centuries. Central to the new ideology was the notion that every 
person, irrespective of religious, ethnic or class background, could freely join the 
nation as long as (s)he swore allegiance to a set of political principles and 
institutions representing the nation‟s values and objectives. A nationalism of a 
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different kind developed in countries with feudal economies and strong absolutist 
rule, Kohn argued. Unmitigated by other pressures or interests in society, this – 
ethnic – nationalism commanded an individual‟s absolute commitment to the 
nation, an attachment overriding all other loyalties. It rejected the notion of 
voluntary association and the representation of the nation as a modern political 
community involved in and committed to contemporary social issues. Instead it 
regarded the nation as an everlasting natural entity that had slowly evolved from 
prehistoric times. Membership of the nation was fixed, being grounded in descent, 
native language, religion and customs and folklore. According to Kohn, the ethnic 
brand of nationalism prevailed in Germany, Central and Eastern Europe and the 
periphery of Western Europe (e.g. Ireland and Spain).  
The civic-ethnic distinction has inspired many authors. In an echo of Kohn, 
Greenfeld and Chirot (1994) identify two types of nations: a political nation, which 
individuals can become part of by either birth or voluntary participation, and an 
ethnic, collectivistic nation, the membership of which is ascribed by descent 
(blood). They associate the first type with Britain and France and the latter with 
Germany and Russia (see also Hagendoorn and Pepels 2000). In similar vein, 
writing about the nation-building projects in the Soviet successor states, Kolstø 
(2000, p. 2) argues that whereas in the West the nation has traditionally been 
understood as a community of citizens held together by a common territory, 
common government authority, a „rival concept that sees the nation as a cultural 
entity … has deep roots in the eastern part of Europe, not least in Russia‟. Brubaker 
(1992) used Kohn‟s framework to account for differences in citizenship and 
immigration policies between France and Germany. Other scholars have been 
quick to put the label ethnic on the nationalisms that followed the fall of 
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communism and the break-up of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia 
(e.g. Ignatieff 1993; Snyder 1993).
1
  
The ethnic-civic dichotomy has also attracted a great deal of criticism. Still 
relatively mild in his critique is A.D. Smith (1991). He agrees with Kohn that 
Western and Eastern models of nationhood have different historical roots, but he 
opposes a crude classification that assigns nations to mutually exclusive ethnic and 
civic categories. Instead he contends that „Every nationalism contains civic and 
ethnic elements in varying degrees and different forms. Sometimes civic and 
territorial elements predominate; at other times it is the ethnic and vernacular 
components that are emphasized‟ (Smith 1991, p. 13). Thus, in Smith‟s view, the 
ethnic-civic framework would correspond more to an ideal type model resembling 
a continuum with two poles than to a typology or classification (Kaufmann and 
Zimmer 2004; see also Zubrzycki 2001). Every nation would be located 
somewhere on this continuum with some occupying a position closer to the civic 
end and some closer to the ethnic end.   
Kymlicka (1999), Nielsen (1999) and Nieguth (1999) have been more 
disapproving of the ethnic-civic dichotomy. They have argued that the ethnic 
category, capturing both inclusive and exclusive concepts, should be decomposed 
into a cultural dimension (language and religion) which is in principle open to 
outsiders and an ascriptive one (kinship, ancestry and race) which is not. Moreover, 
Nielsen (1999) objects to the term civic nationalism if this is taken to mean 
liberalism, democracy and state-territorialism and seen as contrasting with an 
intolerant antidemocratic ethnic nationalism. Pointing to the Latin American 
countries and their experience with military dictatorships, he argues that non-ethnic, 
territorial nationalisms can be quite antidemocratic. He therefore concludes: „Talk 
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of civic nationalism had better be dropped from our political vocabulary (ibid. p. 
127). 
Equally critical is Kuzio (2001; 2002). He contends that both Western and 
Eastern nations rest on strong ethnic foundations and that the former have only 
become more civic in outlook since the 1960s. Drawing on writings of Kaufmann 
(2000) and A.D. Smith (1998), he advances an evolutionary model that relates the 
proportional mix of civic and ethnic practises in a given state to the age of that state 
and to the consolidation of democratic institutions - i.e. the younger the state and 
the less opportunity it had to develop a solid democracy, the more ethnic it still is 
(Kuzio 2002).  
Schoepflin (2000) is particularly outspoken on the ethnic-East/civic-West idea. 
According to him, „the proposition that there is a Good Western nationalism (civic, 
democratic, peace-loving etc) and a Bad Eastern nationalism (nasty, brutish and 
anything but short)‟ represents a „truly lazy‟ attitude (ibid. pp. 4,5). Indeed, he may 
be said to be taking Kuzio‟s argument one step further by arguing that from the 
nineteenth century onwards Western states needed ethnicity to create credible 
national communities. These communities, he goes on to say, were necessary for 
the ever-increasing levels of consent that the state had to win for its expanding role 
in society. „Without ethnicity‟, Schoepflin (2000, p. 6) boldly states, „it is difficult 
to secure democracy‟. Yet, he does contend that ethnic sentiments are currently 
stronger in the East than in the West due to the former region‟s particular 
experience with communism:  
 
Communism eliminated all possible civic institution and codes of conduct, it turned 
these societies into civic deserts where the micro-level patterns of behaviour were 
governed by mistrust and characterized by atomization. It was hardly unexpected, 
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therefore, that ethno-nationalism should have acquired the saliency that it did; there was 
no other identity in the public sphere that could have played this role (ibid. p. 279). 
 
Lastly, Zimmer (2003) made an important contribution to the ethnic-civic debate. 
He criticizes the ethnic-civic dichotomy for grouping inclusive/exclusive notions 
and identity markers in one category (either ethnic or civic). This, he argues, is 
misleading since it presupposes that those who favour a deterministic 
understanding of nationhood by definition use ethno-cultural markers and those 
who endorse an inclusive vision political markers. In reality, however, the former 
could well rely on political markers and the latter on cultural issues, depending on 
the issues and political opportunity structure of the day. He therefore proposes to 
disengage identity markers - „symbolic resources‟ in his terminology - from the 
ethnic-civic distinction so that the remaining dichotomy reflects exclusively 
inclusive/voluntarist vs. ascriptive/organic notions of nationhood - „boundary 
mechanisms‟ in Zimmer‟s terms (ibid. p. 178). He further identified four symbolic 
resources (political values/institutions, culture, history and geography) that political 
entrepreneurs use to back their inclusive or deterministic visions of the nation with. 
 
The ISSP survey: No differences between East and West in understandings of 
nationhood 
  
Until the end of the 1990s the ethnic-civic debate had been very much a theoretical 
exercise dominated by historians and political scientists. If any empirical data were 
at all studied these usually involved statements by politicians, discussions in the 
media or policy documents. Little attention was paid to the attitudes and opinions 
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of the common man, partly because of a lack of data. The 1995 ISSP survey, 
however, which focused on national identity and attitudes towards immigrants,
2
 
made it possible for the first time to examine to what extent the ethnic-civic 
framework is reflected in popular notions of nationhood. To the knowledge of the 
author so far four studies have used this source to explore the popular bases of 
national identity. Jones and Smith (2001a; 2001b), the authors of two of these 
studies, have investigated underlying dimensions in people‟s minds. They based 
their analysis on the following question in the survey:  
 
Some people say the following things are important for being [e.g., truly British, Spanish, 
Hungarian, etc.]. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the 
following is….?‟ 1 (very important), 2 (fairly important), 3 (not very important), or 4 (not 
important at all).  
 
 To have been born in [respondent‟s country].   
 To have citizenship in [respondent‟s country].  
 To have lived in [respondent‟s country] for most of one‟s life. 
 To respect political institutions and laws of [respondent‟s country]. 
 To feel [British, Spanish, Hungarian, etc.]. 
 To be able to speak [the dominant language in respondent‟s country]. 
 To be a [believer in the dominant religion/denomination of respondent‟s  
county (e.g., Protestant, Christian, etc.)]. 
 
Using a rotated factor analysis they found that the answers to this question 
clustered in two distinct dimensions, one capturing the items born, citizenship, 
lived and religion and labelled „ascriptive/objectivist‟ by the authors and another 
correlating strongly with laws, feel and language which they labelled „subjectivist/-
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voluntarist‟. Surprisingly, these dimensions cut right across the ethnic-civic 
dichotomy as traditionally conceived. The notion of voluntarism, for instance, is 
commonly associated with a civic understanding of nationhood but the voluntarist 
dimension in Jones and Smith‟s study also includes language, an element that is 
usually grouped in the ethnic category. Likewise, the idea of ascription (i.e. of 
fixed traits) is attributed to the ethnic model of the nation but Jones and Smith‟s 
ascriptive dimension also incorporates born, citizenship and lived, political items 
that are commonly said to belong to a civic identity. The authors however concede 
that the items may have been understood differently in the various national contexts. 
Thus, whereas place of birth (born) may have been associated with the state and its 
territory in countries like France and the USA which are commonly believed to 
have strong traditions of civic nationhood, the same item may have been 
understood as a substitute for descent in countries with reputedly stronger ethnic 
visions of the nation. In addition, proficiency in the dominant language (language) 
might have been understood as an indicator for integration into the larger (civic) 
community in migrant nations like Australia and the US, while it may have been 
regarded as referring to native language (i.e. an ascribed characteristic) in countries 
that have no tradition of immigration. For these reasons, Smith and Jones decided 
to omit any reference to the ethnic-civic distinction in their characterization of the 
two aforementioned dimensions. Interestingly, their analysis also revealed that in 
most states the ascriptive dimension carried greater weight than the voluntarist 
dimension. They therefore conclude: „our findings suggest an unanticipated 
homogeneity in the ways that citizens around the world think about national 
identity‟ (Jones and Smith 2001a, p. 45), despite „distinctive discourses and 
 11 
policies on national identity, associated with specific religious, social, economic 
and historical trajectories‟ (ibid, p. 58).   
A third study using the ISSP survey focused on national pride, national 
sentiment and xenophobia (Hjerm 2003). The question in the survey on national 
pride was the following:  
 
How proud are you of [country] in each of the following? 
 
1. The way democracy works.    ┐ 
2. Its political influence in the world.   │ 
3. [Country’s] economic achievements.   │ political 
4. Its social security system.    │ 
5. Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society. ┘ 
 
6. Its scientific and technological achievements. ┐ 
7. Its achievements in sports.    │ 
8. Its achievements in the arts and literature.  │ cultural 
9. [Country’s] armed forces.    │ 
10. Its history.      ┘ 
 
Using factor analysis Hjerm distilled two dimensions from the answers to this 
question, one clustering the first five indicators which he interpreted as „political‟, 
and one grouping the last five indicators which he labelled „cultural‟. Interestingly, 
comparing national pride levels in Eastern and Western Europe, Hjerm found 
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similar levels on the cultural dimension but differing ones on the political 
dimension, with Western countries exhibiting higher values of political national 
pride than Eastern states. Although labelling the second dimension as cultural 
seems rather far-fetched, clustering as it does items as diverse as armed forces, 
history, and achievements in sport, arts and science, the East-West difference on 
the more coherent political dimension is noteworthy as it is in line with the 
traditional ethnic-East/civic-West view.   
Unlike the aforementioned studies, the fourth study using the ISSP data source 
(Shulman 2002) did not investigate whether the items of the survey clustered in one 
or more dimensions. Focusing on the same indicators as Jones and Smith and using 
an additional question on the sharing of traditions,
3
 Shulman assumed beforehand 
that the indicators born, citizenship, lived, laws and feel reflected a civic 
understanding of nationhood and the items language, religion and traditions a 
cultural sense of national identity. He took eight countries from the survey to 
represent the West and an equal number to represent the East. Shulman‟s main 
finding was that there were as many indicators contesting the civic-West/ethnic-
East argument as supporting it. In addition, the items that supported the argument 
showed much larger differences within each of the regions than between the two 
regions. These findings led Shulman (2002, p. 583) to conclude that: 
 
Imperial and communist rule have not pushed Eastern European nationhood in a 
strongly cultural direction while greatly weakening civicness. And whereas most of 
the West has a long tradition of democracy and relatively strong and stable political 
institutions, cultural conceptions of nationhood are alive and well.  
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The studies of both Jones & Smith and Shulman suggest that there are no 
substantial differences between regions in the strength of civic/voluntaristic or 
ethnocultural/ascriptive identities. Thus, the East-West component of the ethnic-
civic framework seems to be absent in popular conceptions of nationhood. Yet, as 
we have seen, Hjerm‟s findings on national pride do seem to support the East-West 
divide. This apparent contradiction makes sense if we take a closer look at the 
items clustering on Hjerm‟s political dimension. Three of these items (the way 
democracy works, economic achievements, social security) refer to achievements 
Western nations can obviously take much greater pride in than Eastern states 
simply because the latter have just begun developing their democracies and 
recovering from the post-communist socio-economic crisis.  
 
The Eurobarometer 2002 survey: non-competitive notions of nationhood 
 
Valuable as the ISSP survey has been in uncovering popular conceptions of 
nationhood, it nonetheless had two major drawbacks. First, as pointed out by Jones 
& Smith, a number of items, notably born and language, could have been 
interpreted differently by the respondents, which makes it difficult to assign 
meaning to underlying dimensions in the data. Second, the survey did not contain 
the crucial criterion of genealogical descent, a fact much deplored by Shulman. 
Because of this, the ethnic category of the ethnic-civic framework could not be 
tested to the fullest extent. Moreover, as descent is unequivocally an ascriptive 
characteristic (Zimmer 2003), it could have greatly bolstered Jones & Smith‟s 
dimensions if it had been included.  The Eurobarometer survey on national identity 
compensates for the imperfections of the ISSP survey as it does include the item of 
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descent („common ancestry‟ in the survey).4 Moreover it also contains the item of 
„common history and common destiny‟, a characteristic that is commonly 
associated with an ethnic understanding of nationhood. The survey was held in 
Great Britain, East and West Germany, Greece, Italy, Spain, Austria, Hungary, 
Czech Republic and Poland and contained the following question on national 
identity: 
 
Different things or feelings are crucial to people in their sense of belonging to a nation. 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
“I feel (NATIONALITY) because I share with my fellow (NATIONALITY) … 
 
1. I do not feel (NATIONALITY) 
2. A common culture, customs and traditions 
3. A common language  
4. Common ancestry 
5. A common history and a common destiny 
6. A common political and legal system 
7. Common rights and duties 
8. A common system of social security/welfare 
9. A national economy 
10. A national army 
11. Common borders 
12. A feeling of national pride 
13. National independence and sovereignty 
14. Our national character 
15. Our national symbols (the flag, the national anthem, etc.) 
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Respondents were asked to express their level of agreement with each of the items 
on a scale with the values of 1 (strongly agree), 2 (tend to agree), 3 (tend to 
disagree), 4 (strongly disagree).  
It must be noted that the question on national identity in the Eurobarometer 
survey was worded quite differently from the one in the ISSP survey. Whereas the 
latter asked respondents to evaluate the importance of certain personal 
characteristics for making some one a true [nationality, e.g. Dutchman], the former 
asked them to state the importance of certain characteristics buttressing one‟s own 
sense of national belonging. The ISSP survey therefore taps much more directly 
into the issue of open or closed membership of the nation and therefore into Jones 
& Smith‟s voluntarist-ascriptive dichotomy (or Zimmer‟s boundary mechanisms) 
than the Eurobarometer. It could be argued that because of its specific wording the 
latter relates almost exclusively to properties underpinning national identity 
(political, societal, cultural, historical, state-symbolic, i.e. the symbolic resources in 
Zimmer‟s terms). In other words, the Eurobarometer data primarily cover the 
qualitative nature of national identities rather than inclusive or excluding notions of 
nationhood.  
A rotated factor analysis performed on the Eurobarometer data revealed that the 
aforementioned items grouped into five dimensions (see Table 1 which presents 
data of the ten countries grouped together
5
). The first dimension, which is the most 
powerful in terms of variance explained, could be labelled „patriotic‟ as it clusters 
the items national pride, independence, national character, symbols, and to a lesser 
extent borders. It is more interesting however to examine dimensions two, three 
and four since the items they cover relate to the ethnic-civic framework. As we can 
see, dimension two neatly groups items referring to the political and social system, 
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which makes it plausible to interpret this dimension as political. This result 
corresponds to Hjerm‟s findings on national pride and confirms the contention that 
there is a distinct political dimension to conceptions of nationhood. Interestingly, 
dimensions three (labelled cultural) and four (labelled ethnic) demonstrate that the 
items of culture and language should clearly be seen as a separate category distinct 
from the items ancestry and history. This supports the aforementioned criticism of 
Kymlicka, Nielsen and Nieguth that the ethnic category as traditionally conceived 
should be split into a cultural and an ethnic component.  
 
Table 1 about here 
 
It has to be noted though that the pattern of dimensions for the group of ten states 
as a whole does not necessarily correspond to that of individual states. Not only 
may the dimensions differ but also their order of importance. Whereas West 
Germany for instance follows more or less the general pattern, Hungary presents a 
strongly contrasting picture. Not only do the cultural and ethnic items cluster in one 
dimension instead of two, also the order of the dimensions is reversed with the 
ethno-cultural dimension capturing the highest percentage of variance. Yet, if we 
group the countries into two regions – Western Europe and Eastern Europe – and 
carry out the aforementioned factor analysis by region, then both halves of Europe 
display the same pattern of dimensions as the one for all countries together.
6
 
Western Europe follows the general pattern precisely, both in the nature of the 
dimensions and in their importance, Eastern Europe shows the same dimensions 
but in a slightly different order of importance.
7
 Thus, the dimensions identified in 
Table 1 have cross-regional validity.  
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Interestingly, Table 1 also shows that all items correlate positively with the five 
dimensions. This pattern of positive correlations is even more clearly visible from a 
table of correlations between pairs of items (see Appendix 1 which displays items 
of both the Eurobarometer and ISSP surveys). The positive correlation between for 
instance ancestry and rights (0.44) in the Eurobarometer data means that the higher 
the level of agreement expressed with common ancestry as an identity marker so 
the stronger the support for common rights and duties as a resource underpinning 
one‟s identity. The inference we can draw from this is that people apparently see 
ancestry and rights, and all the other items in both the Eurobarometer and ISSP 
surveys, more as non-competitive complementary concepts than as mutually 
exclusive identity markers. This finding has important consequences for theories on 
the nature of the ethnic-civic framework. It shows that when applied to popular 
notions of nationhood this framework cannot be conceived of as a dichotomy. Nor 
can it be viewed as a continuum with ideal-typical constructs because a continuum 
also implies competing concepts (the more one moves to one end of the continuum 
the further one moves away from the other end). If we are at all to visualize the 
conceptual nature of popular understandings of nationhood, it would be more 
appropriate to picture these understandings as a three-dimensional model 
resembling a cone or a pyramid (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
The fact that the models of a dichotomy or a continuum are unsuitable to describe 
popular notions of nationhood does not mean that they cannot accurately represent 
intellectual discourse. Indeed, contrary to the population at large, many academics, 
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intellectuals and politicians do consider ethnic and civic markers to be competing 
visions of the nation, the tension between the two visions surfacing when 
citizenship and immigration issues are debated in the media. 
 
Partial support for the regional component of the ethnic-civic framework 
 
Now that we have established that the markers associated with the ethnic-civic 
framework cluster in three dimensions (political, cultural and ethnic), we can 
examine differences between countries and between regions in importance assigned 
to these dimensions. Table 2 presents the mean scores for each country and each 
region (Western Europe, Eastern Europe) on the three dimensions.
8
 The lower the 
score, the higher the level of agreement expressed with a particular dimension. 
Scores higher than 2.5 indicate on average disagreement with a certain dimension 
buttressing national identity. The mean scores on the dimensions were calculated 
by (1) adding up the respondent scores of the items clustering in a dimension, (2) 
dividing the resultant figure by the number of these items (producing the 
respondent dimension scores), and (3) taking the average of the respondent 
dimension scores. Appendix 2 shows the average scores on the individual items for 
the ten countries and the two regions.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The average scores of Table 2 reveal that respondents express moderate to high 
levels of agreement across the board. Not one country shows on average 
disagreement with any of the three dimensions. This high level of consensus means 
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that the differences between the countries and between the regions are not overly 
impressive. Yet, the differences are statistically significant at the 0.01 level and do 
go in the expected direction: East European countries consider cultural and ethnic 
criteria more important markers of nationhood than the Western countries, the 
difference between the regions being the largest on the ethnic dimension.
9
 Vice 
versa the political dimension is deemed less relevant by the Eastern countries. The 
results are thus clearly in line with the ethnic-East/civic-West argument.  
Nonetheless, it must be noted that the variation between countries within a 
region is substantial. Thus, Greece, as a West European state, has the lowest score 
on the ethnic and cultural dimensions of all countries, which indicates that it 
attaches more importance to these dimensions than the four Central European states. 
Similarly, Poland‟s average score on the political dimension is much lower than 
that of the other East European states and it is the second lowest score of all 
countries. Close scrutiny of the data in fact shows that the respondents of some 
countries express high levels of agreement with all three dimensions (e.g. Greece 
and Poland), whereas the respondents of other countries are much more reserved 
across the board (e.g. West Germany, Italy). This may reflect different attitudes 
towards social surveys and participating in them as a respondent. Respondents in 
some countries might for instance have felt compelled to provide positive answers, 
leading them to state high levels of agreement, while respondents in other countries 
may not have felt a similar pressure.  
In order to control for the propensity to state either high or low levels of support 
for all three dimensions, we subtracted the scores on the political dimension from 
those on the ethnic and from those on the cultural dimension (Table 3). The 
resulting figures indicate the difference in support between the ethnic and the 
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political dimension on the one hand, and between the cultural and the political 
dimension on the other. The lower the score, the stronger the backing for the ethnic 
or the cultural dimension relative to the political dimension. As we can see, the 
familiar ethnic-East/civic-West pattern emerges even more clearly from the data of 
Table 3. Hungary and the Czech republic top the list of both the ethnic-political and 
cultural-political columns.
10
 Moreover, all East European countries are in the top 
five of the ranking list of countries in the ethnic-political column with Greece being 
the only exception. On the cultural-political dimension the pattern is slightly less 
clear because Poland has a score that is so different from the other Eastern states. 
Aggregated to the regional level, the data show that there are substantial and 
statistically significant differences between East and West, with the former 
attaching much more importance to the ethnic and cultural dimensions in relation to 
the political dimension than the latter.     
 
Table 3 about here 
 
Yet some important reservations have to be stated. First, Eastern Europe is 
represented by just four countries. In the ISSP data set the variations between the 
nine East European countries were at least as large as those between the Western 
states. Thus we might have witnessed larger differences within Eastern Europe if 
the Eurobarometer survey had included more East European countries. Second, it is 
surprising to find West Germany and Austria occupying such low positions on the 
ranking list of countries on the ethnic-political column. Austria even has a positive 
score indicating that its respondents show slightly stronger support for political 
markers than for ethnic markers. This result is not in line with the ethnic-East/civic-
 21 
West idea as originally formulated by Kohn as he grouped the German-speaking 
countries firmly in the ethnic category. Instead, the fault line in the Eurobarometer 
data appears to run along the former Iron Curtain, the former communist states all 
expressing stronger support for the ethnic dimension vis-à-vis the political 
dimension than the traditional capitalist states of the West (Greece being the only 
exception). Related to this issue is the comparatively low level of support by the 
former communist countries for the political dimension. This is not so surprising as 
it might appear at first glance if one reconsiders the items of which this dimension 
is composed. As was the case with Hjerm‟s political dimension of national pride, 
two of these concern the national economy and the social security system. Thus, 
one could again argue that in view of the modest level of real incomes and social 
services in former communist countries in relation to Western countries it is quite 
logical to find only lukewarm support for these items in Hungary and the Czech 
Republic (see Appendix 2).  
This conjecture in turn raises a number of interesting questions. For instance, 
have West Germany and Austria always shown such high levels of support for the 
political dimension in relation to the ethnic dimension? If so, then Kohn was wrong 
to assume that an ethnic conception of nationhood prevailed in the German-
speaking countries at the turn of the century (at least as far as mass attitudes on 
national identity are concerned). If not, then Austrians and West-Germans must 
have moved away from a mainly ethnic to a predominantly political view of the 
nation, a shift that might well be related to the post-war success of these countries 
in developing a strong economy, a generous welfare system and a stable democracy. 
If it can be proven that such a process has indeed occurred, then might we not 
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expect the same identity change to happen in the former communist states as they 
develop their economies and democracies?  
 
Ethnic or civic conceptions of the nation: Do they at all matter? 
 
The reason why the ethnic-civic framework continues to receive so much scholarly 
attention is the assumption by many academics and policy makers that civic 
conceptions of nationhood promote inter-ethnic tolerance and a positive attitude 
towards immigrants. By contrast, ethnic definitions of the nation are seen as 
contributing to xenophobia and racism. Unfortunately, the Eurobarometer survey 
did not contain questions on attitudes towards immigrants. Yet it did ask 
respondents to state how close they felt towards Jews, Gypsies and various other 
nationalities. This question was worded as follows: „I would like you to tell me 
how close you feel to the following groups of people‟. Respondents could state 
their answer on a four-point scale ranging from 1 (very close) to 4 (not at all close). 
If the aforementioned assumption were true one would expect the ethnic and – to a 
lesser extent – the cultural dimensions to display a negative correlation and the 
political dimension a positive correlation with feelings of closeness towards Jews 
and Gypsies (i.e. the stronger the support for the ethnic and cultural dimensions, the 
weaker the feelings of closeness; the stronger the support for the political 
dimension, the stronger the feelings of closeness).  
 
Table 4 about here 
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As we can see in Table 4, this expectation is not at all borne out by the data. All 
three dimensions show only very weak correlations with feelings of closeness, both 
in the West and in the East (6 correlations are not even statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level). Surprisingly, and totally contrary to the expected relationship, the 
ethnic dimension correlates positively with feelings of closeness towards Gypsies 
in the both regions. Another unexpected outcome is that ethnicity correlates 
negatively with feelings of closeness towards Jews in the West but positively with 
these feelings in the East. This would certainly come as a surprise to those who 
believe that ethnic sentiments and anti-Semitism are closely related phenomena 
especially in Eastern Europe.   
As the ISSP survey does include questions on attitudes towards immigrants, we 
can examine whether the pattern of non-correlations from the Eurobarometer also 
surfaces in the data of that survey. In fact, Hjerm (2003) has already used the ISSP 
survey to correlate attitudes on immigrants to national pride and national sentiment. 
The question on immigrants was phrased as follows:  
 
There are different opinions about immigrants from other countries living in [country]. 
(By “immigrants” we mean people who came to settle in [country]). How much do you 
agree or disagree with each of the following statements? 
1. Immigrants increase crime rates. 
2. Immigrants are generally good for [country‟s] economy. 
3. Immigrants take jobs away from people who were born in [country]. 
4. Immigrants make [country] more open to new ideas and cultures. 
 
Hjerm constructed an index of what he called „xenophobia‟ from the answers to 
this question by combining the values on the four statements (these values ranged 
 24 
from 1 - „agree strongly‟ to 5 - „disagree strongly‟ on a five-point scale; the values 
of statements 1 and 3 were reversed to ensure that they go in the same direction). 
He found East European states (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Slovenia) to exhibit higher xenophobia levels than West European states (Austria, 
Britain, Norway, Sweden, The Netherlands). However, correlations with the 
political and cultural dimensions of national pride were weak in both regions, with 
many countries not showing statistically significant results (ibid, pp. 420, 421). 
Although the correlations with the political dimension did go in the expected 
direction (negative – indicating that the more importance assigned to political items 
of national pride the lower the level of xenophobia), the correlations with the 
cultural dimension were negative in two of the East European states (not in line 
with expectation) and positive in four of the five West European states. The first 
result is in concordance with our finding that correlations between the three 
dimensions of nationhood and feelings of closeness to Jews and Gypsies are 
negligible. The last result moreover matches our observation that the correlations 
between ethnicity and feelings of closeness towards Jews show contrasting 
directions in Eastern and Western Europe. 
Remarkably, Hjerm did find a relation between xenophobia and national 
sentiment, a composite variable he constructed from items referring to feelings of 
national superiority, unconditional support for one‟s country and pride in national 
achievements.
11
 Having first established that differences between Eastern and 
Western countries in the levels of national sentiment are small, he then shows that 
national sentiment is positively correlated to xenophobia in both regions (i.e. the 
stronger one‟s national sentiment the higher one‟s level of xenophobia). However, 
the correlations between national sentiment and xenophobia are much stronger in 
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West European states than in East European countries (ibid. pp. 424, 425). These 
results suggest two important conclusions: (1) it is not so much the kind of national 
identity (ethnic, cultural, political) that matters for perceptions on immigrants and 
foreigners, but the strength of national identities and sentiments; (2) Given its 
stronger connection to xenophobia, national sentiment is a more dangerous 
phenomenon in Western Europe than in the Eastern half of this continent. 
Surprisingly, neither Hjerm nor the other authors who used the ISSP data set 
correlated attitudes on immigrants to conceptions of nationhood. Combining 
several databases and making use of multi-level analysis, Jones and Smith (2001b) 
did relate the voluntarist and ascriptive dimensions of national identity to various 
demographic characteristics and to macro-social properties such as a state‟s degree 
of globalization, its degree of post-industrialism, its degree of internal cultural 
differentiation and its militarism. They found that all other things being equal the 
higher a country‟s degree of post-industrialism, the stronger the support of its 
population for the voluntaristic dimension. However, they also found strong 
individual effects, with immigrants, the higher educated and the well-to-do placing 
more importance on the voluntaristic type than the native-born, the lower educated 
and people with modest incomes.    
 
Table 5 about here 
 
To rectify the aforementioned omission, we used the ISSP database to correlate 
Jones & Smith‟s voluntarist and ascriptive dimensions to the composite construct 
of xenophobia.
12
 Obviously, the expectation is that the voluntarist dimension and 
xenophobia are negatively correlated - i.e. respondents who exhibit high scores on 
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this dimension should have lower levels of xenophobia than those with low scores. 
Conversely, those who express strong support for the ascriptive dimension should 
have higher levels of xenophobia than those expressing more moderate support. 
The data of Table 5 produce yet another surprise. The positive correlations between 
the ascriptive dimension and xenophobia in both Eastern and Western Europe are 
still in accordance with the expectation, although it is perhaps remarkable to find 
Western Europe exhibiting the stronger association.
13
 However, what is truly 
astonishing is that the voluntarist dimension is also positively related to xenophobia 
in both regions, albeit to a slightly weaker extent than the ascriptive dimension. 
This means that the stronger a respondent‟s support for voluntaristic, inclusive 
notions of nationhood, the higher that person‟s level of xenophobia. Surely this 
result must come as an unpleasant surprise to those who think that strong inclusive 
national identities are conducive to more positive opinions on immigrants and 
foreigners. Taken together these results provide further evidence for the notion that 
attitudes to immigrants and (in)tolerance of other cultures are not so much 
dependent on the qualitative nature of national identities but more on the intensity 
of these identities.  
 
Discussion and conclusions 
 
This study has examined to what extent the ethnic-civic framework surfaces in 
popular conceptions of nationhood. Using the 2002 Eurobarometer survey on 
national identity it has produced a number of interesting results that complement 
and partially support the findings of studies that utilized the 1995 ISSP survey on 
national identity. 
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First of all, we found that the identity markers covered by the ethnic-civic 
framework clustered in three dimensions – ethnic, cultural and political. The 
identification of a separate cultural factor, distinct from the ethnic dimension, is an 
important new finding. The studies based on the ISSP data set could not explore the 
degree of interrelatedness of cultural and ethnic factors because the ISSP survey 
lacked questions on ethnic markers. As noted before, the existence of a separate 
cultural dimension confirms the contention of some critics of the ethnic-civic 
framework that cultural markers of nationhood should not be grouped in the ethnic 
category because of their inclusive nature. Another point of interest concerns the 
boundaries between identity markers. Whereas our findings conform to the 
commonly held opinion that there are distinct political, ethnic and cultural 
dimensions to national identifications, Jones & Smith‟s voluntarist and ascriptive 
constructs based on the ISSP data cut right across these traditionally conceived 
dimensions, the former clustering respect for law, learn the dominant language and 
self identification and the latter combining born, citizenship, length of residence 
and dominant religion. These contrasting results seem to support Zimmer‟s 
contention that the ethnic-civic framework should be disaggregated into two 
different modes of interpreting national identity – one relating to boundary 
mechanisms and another to symbolic resources. Jones & Smith‟s dimensions seem 
to confirm the existence of boundary mechanisms, while the present study taps into 
symbolic resources. Zubrzycki‟s (2001) study on the debate about the meaning of 
Polishness in the media prior to the adoption of the Polish Constitution in April 
1997 lends further support for Zimmer‟s theory. The liberal intelligentsia engaging 
in this debate turned to events in the past (i.e. a symbolic resource) to support their 
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argument that Poland had a long tradition of inclusive civic nationhood  (i.e. a 
boundary mechanism).     
In fact, our study of the Eurobarometer data revealed that there are also 
resources other than political, cultural and ethnic that shaped national allegiances. 
Four of these clustered in a dimension that we labelled patriotism (which proved to 
be the strongest predictor of national identity) and two remaining items – army and 
common borders – in a construct that could be interpreted as state territory. Thus, 
the markers of national identity are many and varied, and can differ from country to 
country in kind, importance and interrelatedness.  
What they all have in common, however, is their non-competitive nature: not a 
single pair of markers shows a negative correlation in either the ISSP or the 
Eurobarometer database. This is a cardinal finding. As noted before, many authors 
assume ethnic and political visions of the nation or voluntarist and ascriptive 
boundary mechanisms to be mutually excluding concepts – remember that Zimmer 
(2003) argued that the latter could be conceived of as a dichotomy. Yet, valid as 
this interpretation might be for debates among academics, intellectuals and 
politicians, it evidently does not apply to popular notions of nationhood. Thus, 
there may be a distinct difference between the elite and the masses in the way they 
interpret their national attachments. The author of the aforementioned study on the 
Polish constitutional debate also seems to arrive at this conclusion when she notes 
that voter turn-out at the referendum on the Constitution was very low, „which 
seems to indicate that the debates that fascinated the elites did not resonate as 
strongly below‟ (Zubrzycki 2001, p. 653). Non-competitive notions of nationhood 
are in fact not strictly confined to the common man. Zimmer (2003, p. 188) himself 
observes that, in response to the perceived threat from Germany in the late 1930s, 
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Swiss liberals and conservatives united behind the notion of a distinct Swiss 
cultural Wesensgemeinschaft, which effectively „blurred the boundary between 
voluntarist and organic conceptions of nationhood‟. This suggests that the degree in 
which political entrepreneurs disseminate these conceptions as contrasting visions 
of nationhood depends very much on the wider political and social circumstances 
and on the opportunities these circumstances offer them. To come back at the issue 
of elite-mass differences, it must be noted that these differences extend to other 
areas of public opinion as well. Campbell et. (1960), for instance, observed that the 
left-right dimension in politics does not by far influence the American electorate to 
the same extent as it does academics, intellectuals and political professionals. This 
led them to conclude that „the closer the individual stands to the sophisticated 
observer in education and political involvement, the more likely it is that the 
observer‟s analytical constructs will bear fruit‟ (ibid. p. 214). It is doubtful whether 
scholars of nationalism realize that their models are likely to suffer from the same 
deficiency. 
The results of our analyses also revealed quite strong support for the East-West 
component of the ethnic-civic framework. On average East European respondents 
accorded more weight to the cultural and, especially, the ethnic dimension and less 
weight to the political dimension than the respondents from Western Europe. This 
finding appears to somewhat contradict those of Shulman and Jones & Smith. They 
found either small or no differences at all between the regions, and on some 
markers the differences were in the opposite direction from that expected - i.e. the 
East assigning more importance to some „civic‟ markers than the West (see 
Shulman 2002, pp. 567, 569). Remember however that the ISSP data on which 
these authors based their analyses did not contain questions on ethnic markers and 
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that the difference between East and West was most pronounced on the ethnic 
dimension in the Eurobarometer data. In addition, it must be noted that Shulman‟s 
civic and cultural categories did not coincide with Jones and Smith‟s voluntarist 
and ascriptive dimensions. Thus, some items that Shulman considered civic were 
interpreted as ascriptive by Jones and Smith. Finally, taking a close look at 
language and political institutions, identity markers that were included in both data 
sets, it can be noted that the ISSP and the Eurobarometer showed a similar pattern: 
Eastern Europe places greater value on language but less value on political 
institutions than does Western Europe (see Appendix 2 and Shulman 2002, pp. 568, 
571). Thus the data of the two surveys are consistent. 
Obviously, having established the existence of an ethnic-East/political-West 
pattern in a given year says nothing about its stability. The question to explore is 
thus to what extent this pattern of identities is inert, as primordialists would predict, 
or subject to change, as instrumentalists would argue. As the 2001 Eurobarometer 
was a cross-sectional survey carried out at a single point in time, it does not give us 
direct indicators of changes in understandings of nationhood. However, indirectly 
the data suggest that these understandings are dynamic rather than inert. We noted 
before that compared to the other countries in the survey respondents in Austria 
and West Germany expressed strong support for the political dimension relative to 
the ethnic dimension. This is surprising as West Germany and Austria have 
traditionally been seen as countries where ethnic conceptions of nationhood prevail. 
We postulated that ethnic conceptions might indeed have been dominant Austria 
and West Germany but that the success of their post-war democracies and socio-
economic systems may have caused a change in the relative importance of identity 
markers. The post-war political and economic achievements are likely to have 
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increased trust in and therefore identification with public and political institutions 
among broad sections of the population. We further suggested that the same change 
might happen in East European countries, provided they succeed in developing 
stable democracies and prosperous economies. If such a change happened in the 
East, differences between East and West in the qualitative nature of national 
identifications might disappear altogether.  
A change denoting an increased importance of political markers would strongly 
support the argument developed by Kuzio that states become more civic in outlook 
as they grow older and develop stable democracies. On close inspection, one could 
argue that his argument is in fact quite compatible with Kohn‟s ethnic-civic model, 
although Kuzio would probably strongly deny this himself. Kuzio‟s model does not 
rule out the possibility that at some stage in the past ethnic sentiments were 
stronger among Eastern than Western nations. To the knowledge of the author 
Kohn never asked himself what would happen to national identifications in a given 
nation after that nation had come to define itself ethnically. As Kohn was a 
historian who argued that civic nationalism was a new ideology that arose from the 
middle classes at the end of the 18
th
 century, it is hard to imagine him contending 
that ethnic identities once established would be cast in concrete and thus be 
resistant to change. If Kohn were in a position to agree with the argument that 
ethnic national identities can gradually adopt more civic/political features within 
the framework of an independent democratic state, then the opinions of both 
scholars would not differ.  
This study has to end with a sobering note. Despite the ongoing academic debate 
on the ethnic-civic framework and the widely shared concern that ethnic 
nationalism fuels xenophobia and racism, we have not found the type of national 
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affiliations to really matter for attitudes on immigrants and feelings of closeness to 
Jews and Gypsies. Remarkably, this applied to both symbolic resources (ethnic, 
cultural and political markers) and boundary mechanisms (voluntary vs ascriptive 
notions of nationhood). In other words, for their opinions on immigrants and other 
nationalities, it was irrelevant whether respondents cast their national identities in 
ethnic or political terms, in an inclusive or excluding manner. What did matter was 
the level of importance assigned to the identity markers, i.e. the intensity of 
national identifications. The higher this level, the more negative the perceptions on 
immigrants. Thus it is not the kind of national identity but its strength that makes 
the difference. In line with this argument, it is imaginable that people with more 
tolerant views on immigrants have more mixed feelings about national identity in 
general, predisposing them to give only half-hearted support to all markers 
associated with nationhood. In other words, national identity and nationalism may 
be considered improper and unfortunate phenomena altogether by this group of 
people. 
One final reservation has to be stated that might provide some solace to those 
convinced of the connection between ethnic/ascribed identifications and 
xenophobia. Respondents of both surveys most likely were not aware of the 
consequences of each identity marker for membership of the nation when they 
filled out the questionnaire. Had they been informed beforehand of the implications 
of each item for accessibility to the nation and of the classifications and judgements 
that invisible academics analysing their responses would make afterwards, they 
might have shown a different pattern of responses. 
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Notes 
 
1
 For an extensive overview of scholars that were influenced by the ethnic-civic idea and of scholars 
critical of the distinction, see Kuzio (2002) and Shulman (2002). 
2
 These countries are Ireland, New Zealand, Slovak Republic, Netherlands, USA, Canada, Austria, 
Norway, Australia, Great Britain, Poland, Italy, Latvia, Japan, Sweden, Russia, Slovenia, Hungary, 
Czech Republic, Philippines, Spain, Germany (West and East separately) and Bulgaria. 
3
 This question was worded as follows: „Now we would like to ask you a few questions about 
minorities in [respondent‟s country]. How much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statement: it is impossible for people who do not share the customs and traditions [of respondent‟s 
country] to become fully [e.g. British, German, Hungarian, etc]?‟ The question had a 5-point 
agree/disagree scale (agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly). 
4
 Between 27 April 2002 and 10 June 2002, the European Opinion Research Group carried out wave 
57.2 of the standard Eurobarometer, on request of the of the European Commission, Directorate-
General Press and Communication, Opinion Polls. The data of this survey can be ordered at the 
Zentralarchiv fuer empirische Sozialforschung of the Universitaet zu Koeln, Germany.  
5
 As they constitute separate categories in the survey I hold East and West Germany to be separate 
countries. 
6
 I considered Great Britain, West Germany, Spain, Italy, Austria and Greece to represent Western 
Europe, and East Germany, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to belong to Eastern Europe. 
Some observers would include Greece in the East European group, pointing to the long period of 
Ottoman imperial rule and the lack of civic traditions and institutions in the country. We chose to 
include it in Western Europe because of its post-war (interrupted) development as a democratic state 
with a market economy, its early membership of NATO and its inclusion in the EU in the 1981. We 
concede however that this issue is open to debate. 
7
 The output of the factor analyses of Germany, Hungary and Western and Eastern Europe can be 
obtained from the author. 
8
 In calculating the scores for Western and Eastern Europe I followed the method employed by 
Shulman (2002): all the respondents were first pooled for each region and then their scores were 
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averaged. The advantage of this approach is that it enables statistical significance tests of 
differences between the regions. The disadvantage of some countries being overrepresented and 
others underrepresented because of differing sample sizes, which was a major concern of Shulman, 
does not apply for the Eurobarometer data because all countries have approximately equal sample 
sizes.   
9
 To assess the statistical significance of differences in the regions‟ mean scores an independent 
samples t-test was performed on the data. 
10
 This particular result actually matches the ISSP data set because Hungary and the Czech Republic 
headed the ranking list of countries on importance assigned to language in that data set as well 
(remember that language is one of the items constituting the cultural dimension). Moreover, in the 
same data set respondents in both countries expressed weak support for the item „respect political 
institutions and law‟ (Shulman 2002). This is also consistent with their score on the political items 
in the Eurobarometer survey. 
11
 The question covering national sentiment was phrased as follows: “How much do you agree or 
disagree with the following statements?” („agree strongly‟ – „disagree strongly‟ on 5-point scale) 
- I would rather be a citizen of [country] than of any other country in the world. 
- The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like those of 
[country] 
- Generally speaking, [country] is a better country than most other countries 
- People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong 
- When my country does well in international sports, it makes me proud to be [nationality] 
12
 We calculated the voluntarist dimension, the ascriptive dimension and the index of xenophobia in 
the same way as the dimensions of nationhood in the Eurobarometer data set, i.e. we added up the 
respondent scores on the items clustering in a dimension and divided the resulting figure by the 
number of items pooled in that dimension. 
13
 Western Europe includes West Germany, Great Britain, Austria, Italy, Ireland, The Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden and Spain. Eastern Europe is represented by East Germany, Hungary, Czech 
Republic, Slovenia, Poland, Bulgaria, Russia, Latvia and Slovak Republic.  
 
 35 
                                                                                                                                                        
References 
 
BRUBAKER, ROGERS 1992 Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany,  
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 
CAMPBELL, ANGUS et al. 1960 The American Voter, Chicago: The University 
of Chicago Press 
GREENFELD, LIAH and CHIROT, DANIEL 1994 „Nationalism and aggression, 
Theory and society, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 79-103 
HAGENDOORN, LOUK and PEPELS, JOSE 2000 „European nations and 
nationalism: an introductory analysis‟, in Louk Hagendoorn et al. (eds), European 
Nations and Nationalism: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives, Aldershot: 
Ashgate, pp. 1-35 
HJERM, MIKAEL 2003 „National sentiments in Eastern and Western Europe‟, 
Nationalities Papers, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 413-29 
IGNATIEFF, MICHAEL 1994 Blood and Belonging: Journeys into the New 
Nationalism, London: Vintage 
JONES, FRANK L. and SMITH, PHILIP 2001a „Diversity and commonality in 
national identities: an exploratory analysis of cross-national patterns‟, Journal of 
Sociology (published by the Australian Sociological Association), vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 
45-63 
-- 2001b „Individual and societal bases of national identity: a comparative multi-
level analysis‟, European Sociological Review, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 103-118 
KAUFMANN, ERIC 2000 „Ethnic or civic nation? Theorizing the American case‟, 
Canadian Review of Studies in Nationalism, vol. 27, nos. 1-2, pp. 133-55. 
 36 
                                                                                                                                                        
KAUFFMAN, ERIC and ZIMMER, OLIVER 2004 „ „Dominant ethnicity‟ and the 
„ethnic-civic‟ dichotomy in the work of A.D. Smith‟, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 
10, no. 1&2, pp. 63-78 
KOHN, HANS 1944 The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and 
Background, New York: Macmillan 
-- 1962 The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global History, Westport, Ct: 
Greenwood Press 
-- 1994 „Western and eastern nationalism‟, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. 
Smith (eds.) Nationalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 162-65 
KOLSTØ, PÅL 2000 Political Construction Sites: Nation-Building in Russia and 
the Post-Soviet States, Boulder, Colorado: Westview press 
KUZIO, TARAS 2001 „Nationalising states‟ or nation-building? A critical review 
of the theoretical literature and empirical evidence‟, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 
7, no. 2, pp. 135-54 
-- 2002 „The myth of the civic state: a critical survey of Hans Kohn‟s framework 
for understanding nationalism‟, Ethnic and Racial studies, vol. 25, no. 1, pp. 20-39 
KYMLICKA, WILL 1999 „Misunderstanding nationalism‟ in Ronald Beiner (ed), 
Theorizing Nationalism, Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 131-40 
NIEGUTH, TIM 1999 „Beyond dichotomy: Concepts of the nation and the 
distribution of membership‟, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 5, no. 2, pp. 155-73 
NIELSEN, KAI 1999 „Cultural nationalism, neither ethnic nor civic‟ in Ronald 
Beiner (ed), Theorizing Nationalism, Albany: State University of New York Press, 
pp. 119-30 
SCHÖPFLIN, GEORGE 2000 Nations, Identity, Power, London: Hurst & 
Company 
 37 
                                                                                                                                                        
SHULMAN, STEPHEN 2002 „Challenging the civic/ethnic and West/East 
dichotomies in the study of nationalism‟, Comparative Political Studies, vol. 35, no. 
5, pp. 554-85 
SMITH, ANTHONY D. National Identity, London: Penguin 
-- 1998 Nationalism and Modernism, London: Routledge  
SNYDER, JACK 1993 „Nationalism and the crises of the post-Soviet state‟ in 
Michael E. Brown (ed), Ethnic Conflict and International Security), Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, pp. 79-101 
ZIMMER, OLIVER 2003 „Boundary mechanisms and symbolic resources: towards 
a process-oriented approach to national identity‟, Nations and Nationalism, vol. 9, 
no. 2, pp. 173-193 
ZUBRZYCKI, GENEVIEVE 2001 „ „We, the Polish Nation‟: Ethnic and civic 
visions of nationhood in Post-Communist constitutional debates‟, Theory and 
Society, vol. 30, pp. 629-668 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1 about here 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2 about here 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38 
                                                                                                                                                        
Table 1. Factor analyses of fourteen national identity items (data from ten European 
countries; N=8655) 
 
 
 
Item 
Dimension 
       1 
(patriotic) 
 
       2 
(political) 
 
       3 
(cultural) 
      
      4 
(ethnic) 
 
           5 
(army&borders)  
culture 0.278 0.224 0.752 0.312 0.080 
language 0.208 0.217 0.822 0.256 0.139 
ancestry 0.257 0.187 0.374 0.758 0.182 
history 0.297 0.288 0.298 0.762 0.109 
legal system 0.256 0.762 0.180 0.303 0.126 
rights and duties 0.267 0.823 0.212 0.166 0.084 
social security 0.210 0.827 0.151 0.085 0.249 
economy 0.254 0.677 0.147 0.135 0.472 
army 0.393 0.363 -0.006 0.239 0.705 
borders 0.413 0.250 0.326 0.085 0.678 
national pride 0.776 0.227 0.189 0.202 0.261 
independence 0.766 0.343 0.176 0.122 0.200 
national character 0.789 0.266 0.209 0.195 0.164 
symbols 0.762 0.167 0.188 0.248 0.228 
 
NB: 1. The first item („I do not feel [nationality]‟) was excluded from the analysis. 
 2. Items that show loadings of more than 0.5 are underlined. 
 3. The percentages of variance explained of the five dimensions were 23.1, 22.0, 13.2, 12.0 and 10.9  
                  respectively. The corresponding eigenvalues were 3.24, 3.08, 1.84, 1.68, and 1.52.  
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Table 2. Mean scores on dimensions of national identity across ten European countries and 
two regions 
 
 
  
Cultural 
 
(cultural + language) 
 
Ethnic 
 
(ancestry + history) 
 
Political 
 
(legal system +  
rights&duties + social 
security + economy) 
 
West Germany 1.69 1.88 1.90 
Greece 1.28 1.26 1.47 
Italy 1.64 1.83 1.88 
Spain 1.57 1.70 1.68 
Great Britain 1.57 1.72 1.78 
Austria 1.46 1.81 1.78 
East Germany 1.54 1.70 1.88 
Czech Republic 1.48 1.65 2.03 
Hungary 1.35 1.47 1.92 
Poland 1.41 1.42 1.56 
    
East 1.44 1.56 1.84 
West 1.53 1.69 1.74 
 
NB: 1. On each dimension the difference between the mean scores of the two regions is statistically 
 significant at an 0.01 level. 
 2. The N of each country score ranges from 766 (Great Britain) to 1013 (Hungary). Approximately  
    1000 respondents were interviewed in each country. The lower N of Great Britain is explained by the  
     many British respondents who indicated that they did not feel British (item one). We excluded these 
     respondents from the analysis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Differences of mean scores between the ethnic and the political dimension and 
between the cultural and the political dimension across ten European states and two regions 
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 ethnic minus political  cultural minus political 
Hungary -0.46 Hungary -0.58 
Czech Republic -0.38 Czech Republic -0.55 
Greece -0.21 East Germany -0.34 
East Germany -0.17 Austria -0.32 
Poland -0.14 Italy -0.25 
Great Britain -0.06 West Germany -0.22 
Italy -0.05 Great Britain -0.21 
West Germany -0.02 Greece -0.19 
Spain 0.01 Poland -0.16 
Austria 0.03 Spain -0.12 
    
East  -0.29 East -0.41 
West -0.05 West -0.22 
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Table 4. Pearson correlations between feelings of closeness towards ethnic others and 
dimensions of nationhood in two regions 
 
          West             East 
 
 feeling close to 
Jews 
feeling close to 
Gypsies 
 feeling close to 
Jews 
feeling close to 
Gypsies 
cultural -0.02 -0.00      0.05** 0.01 
ethnic   -0.03*    0.03*    0.03* 0.02 
political -0.02    0.03*  0.02    0.06** 
 
*   statistically significant at an 0.05 level 
** statistically significant at an 0.01 level 
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Table 5. Pearson correlations between xenophobia and  
dimensions of nationhood in two regions 
 
                   West                 East 
 
 xenophobia  xenophobia 
voluntaristic 0.19**  0.18** 
ascriptive 0.33**  0.21** 
 
** statistically significant at an 0.01 level 
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Appendix 1. Pearson correlations between national identity indicators  
 
 
Eurobarometer survey 
 
 cult lang anc hist leg r&d ss econ arm bor np ind nc sym 
culture - .66 .62 .60 .46 .45 .40 .42 .36 .44 .47 .46 .49 .47 
language  - .62 .57 .46 .44 .39 .41 .36 .44 .44 .42 .46 .46 
ancestry   - .72 .48 .44 .40 .44 .43 .45 .51 .47 .51 .50 
history    - .57 .50 .43 .46 .43 .48 .52 .50 .53 .51 
legal system     - .74 .67 .65 .54 .50 .49 .52 .50 .46 
rights and duties      - .73 .65 .51 .50 .48 .52 .49 .44 
social security       - .74 .55 .50 .45 .52 .47 .41 
economy        - .65 .57 .51 .57 .53 .48 
army         - .62 .59 .59 .57 .58 
borders          - .62 .60 .58 .56 
national pride           - .73 .71 .70 
independence            - .72 .66 
national character             - .70 
symbols              - 
 
 
 
ISSP survey 
 
  
born 
 
 
citizenship 
 
lived 
 
law 
 
feel 
 
language 
 
religion 
 
traditions 
born - .50 .57 .10 .26 .26 .41 .27 
citizenship  - .44 .28 .33 .36 .28 .18 
lived   - .16 .36 .37 .38 .25 
law    - .28 .28 .16 .10 
feel     - .30 .22 .16 
language      - .21 .22 
religion       - .19 
traditions        - 
 
NB: 1. The N for each correlation ranged from 9210 to 9630 in the Eurobarometer survey and from 28107 
    to 29870 in the ISSP survey. 
2. All the correlations in the two tables are statistically significant at an 0.01 level. 
3. ISSP data: we added the separate question on traditions (see note 3) to the other seven items on national  
    identity. 
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Appendix 2. Mean scores on items of national identity across ten European countries and two regions  
 
 culture language ancestry history legal 
system 
rights& 
duties 
social 
security 
economy 
West Germany 1.79 1.59 1.88 1.89 1.89 1.82 1.92 2.01 
Greece 1.30 1.26 1.25 1.26 1.43 1.43 1.56 1.51 
Italy 1.71 1.57 1.75 1.92 1.95 1.78 1.91 1.89 
Spain 1.61 1.53 1.69 1.71 1.74 1.63 1.67 1.73 
Great Britain 1.67 1.46 1.71 1.74 1.80 1.73 1.82 1.82 
Austria 1.51 1.41 1.88 1.75 1.78 1.69 1.74 1.92 
East Germany 1.61 1.47 1.70 1.71 1.92 1.83 1.88 1.95 
Czech Republic 1.54 1.43 1.62 1.68 2.05 1.95 2.10 2.05 
Hungary 1.39 1.31 1.48 1.46 1.84 1.84 2.08 1.96 
Poland 1.46 1.35 1.42 1.42 1.53 1.56 1.60 1.57 
         
East 1.50 1.39 1.55 1.57 1.83 1.80 1.92 1.88 
West 1.60 1.47 1.69 1.71 1.76 1.68 1.77 1.81 
 
NB: The N of each country score ranges from 793 to 1016. 
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Figure 1. Popular understandings of national identity 
important  
important  
political markers 
important  
cultural markers  
ethnic markers  
not important  
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